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What Caused Chicago Bank Failures in the Great Depression? A Look at the 1920s 
 
 
This paper reassesses the causes of Chicago state bank failures during the Great 
Depression by tracking the evolution of their balance sheets in the 1920s. I find that 
all banks suffered tremendous deposit withdrawals; however banks that failed 
earlier in the 1930s had invested more in mortgages in the 1920s. The main 
problem with mortgages was their lack of liquidity, not their quality. Banks heavily 
engaged in mortgages did not have enough liquid assets to face the withdrawals, 
and failed. This paper thus reasserts the importance of pre-crisis liquidity risk 
management in preventing bank failures.  
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Introduction 
 
The recent financial crisis has revived interest in the causes of bank failures. A lively and 
ongoing debate on Depression banking panics in the United States has drawn increasing 
attention to the significance of illiquidity and falling asset values as causes of bank failure. 
On the one hand, there is compelling evidence that exogenous falls in the value of bank 
assets had a significant impact on the likelihood of survival (Calomiris and Mason 1997, 
2003; Esbitt 1986; Guglielmo 1998; Temin 1976; Thomas 1935; White 1984). On the other 
hand, there is also evidence that liquidity mattered (Friedman and Schwartz 1963; Wheelock 
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1991; Wicker 1996). For instance, Carlson, Mitchener, and Richardson (2011) and 
Richardson and Troost (2009) show that liquidity provision by the central bank reduced the 
risk of bank failure. In the same vein, Mitchener and Richardson (2013) show that interbank 
deposit withdrawals unrelated to target banks' internal conditions increased their probability 
of failure. 
These results highlight the fact that both exogenous insolvency risk (falls in asset 
values) and illiquidity risk can contribute to bank failure risk. In fact, deposit withdrawals 
rarely occur in the absence of a shock to asset values. As depositors are usually risk-
intolerant, even small shocks to insolvency risk can cause solvent banks to fail through large 
deposit withdrawals (Calomiris and Gorton 1991). Most authors of empirical studies of 
these questions agree that exogenous insolvency risk rose for all banks in the Depression 
and that it was one of the main factors behind the mass withdrawals witnessed at the time. 
Even Friedman and Schwartz (1963) concede that the “contagion of fear” leading to 
banking panics partly originated in agricultural regions where output had fallen since the 
end of the First World War.1 
The central problem is thus not so much to determine which of these two factors 
caused banks to fail; rather it is to determine the relative importance of each. A pertinent 
question to ask is how important endogenous illiquidity risk was, above and beyond any 
observed exogenous increase in insolvency risk. Bank failures could have occurred either 
because the exogenous shock to assets was very large, or because only a small shock 
occurred but those banks were highly illiquid. For instance, imagine two banks which have 
identical exogenous declines in their asset values and have the same leverage, which means 
they have identical exogenous increases in insolvency risk. As a consequence, both banks 
experience similar deposit outflows. But one of them has enough cash to handle those 
                                                          
1 See also, for example, Calomiris and Kahn (1991) and Calomiris and Wilson (2004). 
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withdrawals, while the other does not, and consequently fails. This would be an example of 
cross-sectional differences in survival primarily driven by liquidity risk. Note that what is 
driving failure risk here is not exogenous liquidity risk (deposit withdrawals) but 
endogenous liquidity risk: the fact that the second bank was less liquid ex ante than the first 
one. 
The aim of this paper is to answer this question for Great Depression Chicago, which 
had one of the highest urban bank failure rates in the country.2 It extends the existing 
literature on Chicago (notably Calomiris and Mason (1997)) by using extant balance sheet 
data from as early as 1923 to focus specifically on the long-run relative importance of each 
pre-crisis financial ratio in predicting failure.3 In particular, this study makes explicitly clear 
that some pre-crisis balance sheet items are linked to banks’ liquidity, not just to banks' 
future probability of incurring losses. For example, cash holdings are obviously linked to 
banks’ capacity to meet cash withdrawals. Similarly, long-term loans can be riskier from a 
liquidity point of view, because of the increased maturity mismatch. Some balance sheet 
items are thus intrinsically less liquid than others, regardless of their quality.  With this in 
mind, I separate bank failures into three cohorts ordered through time (1931, 1932 and 1933 
failures) and examine the evolution of their balance sheets over the whole decade of 1923-
1933. 
My first finding is that, while depositors ran on all banks, what really differentiated 
banks’ probability of failure was the size of their real estate loan investments in the pre-
                                                          
2 Out of 193 state banks in June 1929, only 35 survived up to June 1933. 
3 Calomiris and Mason (1997) found that banks that failed during the summer 1932 crisis had more in common 
with other banks that failed earlier in 1932 than with survivors, thereby suggesting that widespread depositor 
fear was not the primary cause of failure. In particular, these banks had lower ratios of reserves to demand 
deposits, lower ratios of retained earnings to net worth, and higher proportions of long-term debt in December 
1931. They also lost more deposits in 1931. See also Thomas (1935), Esbitt (1986), and Guglielmo (1998). 
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crisis period. Examining cohorts of bank failures graphically through time, I show that they 
are most clearly ordered in terms of their mortgage holdings: the more a bank held in 
mortgages, the earlier it failed. The ordering is not so clear for other balance sheet items, 
such as capital, reserves, stocks and bonds, and other loans. This is confirmed 
econometrically by an ordered logistic model, which suggests that mortgages have the 
largest predictive power.  
 More importantly, the results emphasize mortgages’ inherent lack of liquidity as a 
determinant risk factor. There are three reasons to think that the quality of mortgages did not 
play a significant role. First, most mortgages had a 50 percent loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, 
while land values fell by less than 50 percent in Chicago before 1933. This means that banks 
cannot have incurred any significant losses on defaulting loans. Second, mortgages had 
longer contract maturities (three to five years) than other loans, and even longer de facto 
maturities. Long maturities, the absence of secondary markets and the impossibility of 
rediscounting these loans at the Federal Reserve meant that they were inherently less liquid 
than other types of loans. Third, I show that locational differences in land values within 
Chicago did not have a differential impact on bank failure rates. 
The view that illiquid assets were the main cause of failure is supported by evidence 
that all banks engaged in fire sales of other loans and securities. In this process, mortgages 
could not be liquidated. Indeed, real estate loans increased as a share of total assets for all 
banks during the Depression, at the same time as assets as a whole were declining. Other 
types of loans, such as loans on collateral security and “other loans,” were promptly 
liquidated.  
These findings suggest significant policy implications from a regulatory point of 
view. They show that long-term investments in illiquid assets play an important role in bank 
failure. This does not rule out a role for lenders of last resort as a within-crisis solution. But 
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it does suggest a role for regulatory authorities in crisis prevention, namely ensuring that 
banks meet liquidity requirements such as maintaining healthy cash ratios. Such regulatory 
measures may include, for instance, renewed emphasis on cash ratios or other liquidity 
requirements. This is all the more important given that central banks cannot always 
accurately predict the quality of banks’ collateral (especially in the case of assets maturing 
at a much later date), making central banks' task a highly complex  and possibly imperfect 
one (Goodhart 2010).4  
Making banks responsible for their liquidity risk management -- not just for their 
credit risk management -- is an idea that has only taken hold in the past few years 
\citepgoodhart08. While it was considered an important aspect of bank regulation from the 
nineteenth century to the early twentieth century in the United States, it was then more or 
less abandoned, to be replaced since the 1980s by a much more pressing focus on credit risk, 
and, in particular, capital requirements. Liquidity requirements were indeed almost absent 
from the Basel I and Basel II regulations, and only recently made a comeback in the Basel 
III regulations.5  
The results of this paper also invite a reassessment of the role of real estate in the 
Great Depression. While largely unmatched, Chicago’s real estate boom resembled both in 
character and magnitude the suburban booms of other major cities in the East North Central 
                                                          
4 Note that the interpretation presented in this paper significantly contrasts with Diamond and Dybvig (1983), 
who argue that bank runs are usually undesirable phenomena that cause even “healthy” banks to fail. Although 
in their view “healthy” usually means “solvent,” I suggest that a relatively solvent but particularly illiquid bank 
ex ante is not necessarily healthy. To some extent banks should be prepared for out-of-equilibrium events such 
as runs. 
5 However it is important to note that so-called liquidity-coverage ratios can lead to confusion and to 
regulatory arbitrage due to their complexity. Perhaps focusing on simple cash ratios would be a better 
alternative. 
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region. This region also experienced one of the highest numbers of bank suspensions in the 
country.6 A number of recent papers have shown that, in the aggregate, the direct 
contribution of real estate to the decline in economic activity was small (Field 2014; White 
2014).7 This paper assesses its possible indirect contribution via the banking channel.8  
 
Chicago banks in the building boom 
 
 
In the 1920s Chicago experienced one of the largest real estate booms in the country, partly 
as a result of circumstances created by World War I. In the first place, a near embargo on 
labour and building material created a housing shortage which realtors were eager to 
compensate for after the war (U.S. Congress 1921). In addition, the war led to a substantial 
boom in agricultural goods and land, which quickly gave way to a deep recession in farming 
areas when the war came to an end. As a flourishing business centre lying next to the vast 
                                                          
6 The Chicago boom can be compared in particular to those of Detroit, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia (see Wicker 
1996, pp. 16,18), and Toledo (Messer-Kruse 2004). See also Allen (1931). For aggregate data on bank 
suspensions by region, see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1937, p. 868). 
7 Both White (2014) and Field (2014) study the relationship between housing and the Depression nationally 
and argue that the 1920s real estate boom cannot have been an important cause of the following slump -- some 
of their arguments related to commercial banking will be examined below. Temin (1976) dwells very little on 
the real estate market and simply mentions that a fall in construction may have been at the origin of the 
contraction. Snowden analyzes the mortgage market in the 1920s and 1930s, without attempting to determine 
the existence of a causal link with the Depression (Snowden 2003, 2010). 
8 Some studies have also emerged focusing on the government's policy response to mortgage distress in the 
1930s (Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor 2001; Fishback, Horrace, Kantor, Lagunes, and Treber 2009; Fishback, 
Rose, and Snowden 2013; Rose 2011; Wheelock 2008). 
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but weakened agricultural lands of the Midwest, Chicago profited from this situation 
perhaps more than any other city in the United States. 
Progress in economic activity and the near-constant arrival of new inhabitants in 
search of higher wages brought an excitement to the city that led to a significant 
construction boom (see James (1938, p. 939), Allen (1931) and Sakolski (1966)). Figure 1 
shows that building construction reached a peak in 1925-1926. From 1918 to 1926 the 
population of Chicago increased by 35 percent, while the number of lots subdivided in the 
Chicago Metropolitan Region increased by 3,000 percent (Hoyt 1933, p. 237).9  
 
<Figure 1 about here> 
 
 
Commercial banks were not the only real estate lenders, but they played an 
important role in allowing this boom to develop.10 Granted, nationally-chartered banks were 
heavily restricted by law in terms of mortgage lending, and their assets made up nearly 40 
percent of all bank assets (University of Illinois Bulletin 1929). First National rivaled in size 
the largest bank in Chicago, Continental Illinois, which was state-chartered. As a 
contemporary made clear, “by the summer of 1929 ... the Continental Illinois and the First 
National towered over the Chicago money market like giants” (James 1938, p. 952).11 
Nevertheless, a huge number of small unit banks swarmed around the city, most of them 
state-chartered and therefore only lightly constrained by law (White 1983). As James put it, 
                                                          
9 See also (Fisher 1928, p. 3). 
10 Individuals, B&Ls, and mutual savings banks were often more prevalent lenders in the country as a whole 
(Snowden 2010). However Bayless and Bodfish (1928) point out that Chicago was atypical in that commercial 
banks supplied at least 50 percent of the market. 
11 Indeed, together they were responsible “for about half of the banking business transacted in the city” (ibid.). 
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“around these great banks of the Loop, there nestled, however, some 300 outlying 
commercial banks, each of which appeared microscopic [alongside] the Continental or the 
First although, in the aggregate, they handled a considerable proportion of the city's 
business.” In December 1929, state banks made up 95.5 percent of all banks in the city 
(University of Illinois Bulletin 1929). 
These small banks were usually unable to branch, due to restrictive state banking 
laws in Illinois. Consequently most of them catered to their local communities, investing in 
local projects, often in real estate. This is suggested by James (1938, p.954), who notes: 
“each of these banks represented a financial centre for the community it served, and 
anything that concerned the bank was of outstanding local importance.” Similarly, Hoyt 
(1933, p. 249) emphasizes that “outlying banks furnished depositories for local funds and 
collected neighbourhood savings for reinvestment in local building projects” (see also James 
(1938, pp. 944, 953,954, 993) and Hoyt (1933, p. 270)). James also speculated that the 
soundness of the banks was “intimately related to the building boom” (James 1938, p. 
953).12  
Soon after the Depression started, several waves of banking crises shook the country. 
Chicago was probably one of the worst hit cities (Wicker 1996). Deposit withdrawals began 
as early as 1930, gained pace in early 1931 and redoubled in 1932, especially during the 
summer, as was documented by Calomiris and Mason (1997). A significant number of 
banks survived the first waves of panic but many failed later on. 1933 saw the last banking 
panic, which eliminated a few more banks before giving way to a long-needed respite. 
 
                                                          
12 Had they been allowed to branch, they would have likely been able to better diversify their assets and 
prepare for a sudden backlash (Carlson 2001; Calomiris and Mason 2003; Mitchener 2005). See the Appendix 
for a more complete discussion of the role of unit (and chain) banking in the Chicago boom. 
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Data 
 
The principal aim of this paper is to understand the specific factors that might have led 
banks to fail in these different waves, and in particular to examine what might have 
contributed to the timing of their failure. In this section I provide details on the data used 
and the underlying empirical framework. 
The Statements of State Banks of Illinois are the most detailed and accessible semi-
annual source of balance sheet data, though they only report on state-chartered banks (both 
members and non-members of the Federal Reserve System).13 These banks generally 
reported at the end of June and December of each year, which allows me to look at balance 
sheets in all years from 1923 up to 1933 for the first time. The years 1920-22 are recession 
years and are not examined in this study (see James (1938, p. 939) and Hoyt (1933, p. 236)). 
The full dataset includes: December 1923, December 1924, June 1925, June 1926, June 
1927, June and December 1928, June and December 1930, June and December 1931, June 
and December 1932 and June 1933. All Statements give asset book values.  I also make use 
of Rand McNally Bankers’ Directory, a recognized source for tracking down bank name 
changes and consolidations (see the Appendix for more detail). 
I divide banks into four cohorts: survivors, June 31 failures, June 32 failures, and 
June 33 failures. The survivor category tracks each bank and only includes the banks present 
                                                          
13 See the previous section and the Appendix for information on national banks and reasons for their exclusion 
from this study. 
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at every point in time from June 1929 to June 1933. This system allows me to create a 
balanced sample over the Depression period.14  
 
<Table 1 about here> 
 
The choice of the windows of failure was necessarily somewhat arbitrary, but not entirely 
so. Chicago was hardest hit by banking crises in the spring of 1931 and in the spring and 
early June of 1932 (Wicker 1996, pp. 68-69, 112). Thus selecting the banks that failed 
between January and June 1931 and banks that failed between January and June 1932 allows 
me to include banks that were especially affected by banking crises as well as non-panic 
failures. There is no 1930 cohort. This is because the wave of bank failures following that of 
Caldwell and Company in November 1930 was mainly confined to the southern regions of 
Tennessee, Arkansas and Kentucky (Wicker 1996, p. 58). By contrast the early 1933 crisis 
was nationwide, prompting me to analyze the few banks that failed in Chicago at the time 
(ibid, p. 108).15 In general, while some banks failed before -- and between -- these cohorts, I 
selected the cohorts that seemed most important to explain Chicago bank failures. 
 
<Table 2 about here> 
 
 
                                                          
14 For the same reason it is reasonable to make each cohort “exclusive” in the sense that each cohort excludes 
the banks that failed before the “window of failure” for the whole cohort. For example, the June 1931 failure 
cohort does not include banks that had failed by December 1930. It only includes banks that had survived until 
December 1930 and failed between the start of 1931 and June of that year. 
15 Although some may argue that many of these banks failed for exogenous reasons (many of these closures 
where ordered by the government). 
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Table 1 shows the different cohorts and the corresponding reporting dates. Following White 
(1984), I exclude the few banks that closed and later reopened. Including them in the 
analysis does not significantly change the results. Often some cohort banks were not present 
in every year from 1923 to 1928. For example, there are 46 June 1931 failures, but only 39 
of them were present in June 1926.16 The resulting variation in sample sizes will not directly 
affect the econometric analysis of the pre-1929 period, since ordered logistic regression only 
uses cross-sections in one particular year. Table 2 shows the sample sizes for each cohort at 
various points in time.17  
A consolidation was “the corporate union of two or more banks into one bank which 
continued operations as a single business entity and under a single charter” (Richardson 
2007). During the Depression, mergers were described colloquially as “shotgun weddings,” 
whereas takeovers were part of the “purge and merge system” (James 1938, p. 994). Merger 
and takeover are usually considered in the literature as major signs of weakness. I follow 
Calomiris and Mason (2003) in counting as failures banks that were taken over by other 
banks. This occurred in 14 cases from June 1929, though the results are robust to a different 
treatment. 
The treatment of mergers that ended up failing can be tricky because it is not clear 
which of the two parties in the merger was the weakest. A healthy bank may have merged 
with a less healthy bank which then dragged the former into bankruptcy. So instead of 
categorizing such mergers as a failure of both banks at the time of merger, when possible I 
kept both banks alive by splitting the merger's balance sheet in parts proportional to the size 
                                                          
16 This number may fluctuate between December 1923 and June December 1928 as, say, a fall from 40 to 39 
banks may occur twice if different banks have appeared and disappeared. 
17 Note that in the regression models below sample sizes may not exactly equal those shown here. The reason 
is that some of these banks lacked data for some explanatory variables (including, for instance, such crucial 
variables as total deposits) and were thus automatically excluded by the statistical software. 
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of each bank. In addition, I expressed the failure of a merger as the failure of the two 
merged banks.18 
 
 
Empirical results 
 
A study of Chicago bank balance sheets shows that deposit losses alone cannot explain bank 
failures. An analysis of the same balance sheets, using an ordered logistic model, shows that 
mortgage lending is an important part of the explanation. In this section I deal with these 
two points in turn. 
 
Deposit losses 
 
Firstly, consider deposit losses. Key variables used here are the cumulative rates of decline 
in deposits19 from the end of June 1929 to December 1930, from June 1929 to December 
1931, and from June 1929 to December 1932. The deposit data is based on the last call 
before failure, which for some failures was almost six months before their failure date. The 
deposit losses of banks failing during any of the major panics of April 1931 and June 1932 
incurred during this period are therefore not reflected in the variables.20 Figure 2 shows the 
                                                          
18 The results are robust either way. The Appendix provides more detail on each merger, on the fate of 
Continental Illinois, and on name changes. 
19 Total deposits include demand deposits, time deposits and due to other banks. 
20 A survival model for the liability side is available in the Appendix. It confirms the importance of deposit 
losses in predicting failure, while rejecting any significant role for capital. 
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cumulative growth rate of total deposits, and Table 8 in the Appendix shows each cohort 
mean as well as tests of differences between them. 
 
<Figure 2 about here> 
 
Clearly, all banks lost tremendous amounts of deposits. In 1930 the first failure 
cohort lost on average 22 percent of their deposits, and in December 1931 the second, third 
and survivor cohorts had lost respectively 59 percent, 43 percent and 37 percent. Looking at 
1930, the difference in deposit losses between the first failure cohort and survivors is only 
borderline significant, and is not significant when compared to other failure cohorts. On the 
other hand, a year later the magnitude of the second failure cohort's withdrawals 
significantly differs from survivors’; this may be due to a learning effect.21 Their survivor 
category also includes my June 1933 failures cohort. Yet even in this case deposit losses 
were very large for survivors (around 37 percent compared to 59 percent for June 1932 
failures). More importantly, by June 1932, survivors themselves had lost 60 percent of total 
deposits.22 This suggests that all banks suffered a severe liquidity shock, and that differences 
in cumulative deposit withdrawals cannot easily explain bank failure. 
 
Ex ante balance sheet ratios 
 
                                                          
21 Note that these figures differ slightly from Calomiris and Mason (1997)'s as their sample included national 
banks as well. 
22 Note that some central-reserve city banks in the Loop, most of which ended up surviving, benefited from an 
inflow of deposits in the summer 1931 crisis as outlying banks closed and some of the money was redeposited 
in the Loop banks (see, in particular, Mitchener and Richardson (2013) and U.S. Congress (1934, part 2, p. 
1062)). Despite such inflows their total cumulative deposit losses were very large, as Figure 2 suggests. 
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If deposits cannot by themselves explain why some banks failed and others did not, other 
aspects of bank balance sheets should help explain this difference. This section examines 
some of the most important pre-crisis ratios that are related to bank health. Graphical 
analysis and a logistical model suggest that real estate loans were more significant than 
other ratios -- such as capital, government bonds and other loans -- as predictors of bank 
failure. I deal in turn with the graphical analysis and the logistic model. Note that geometric 
means are used throughout due to the ratios’ right skew.23  
Figure 3 shows the share of real estate loans (both residential and commercial) to 
total assets by cohort from 1923 onwards.24 In the pre-Depression era, survivors often had 
the lowest mortgage share during most of the 1920s, followed closely by June 1933 failures. 
June 1932 failures had a substantially higher share, and the June 1931 failures’ share was 
even higher. Interestingly, some form of divergence between June 1932 failures and 
survivors from around 1926 onwards is also noticeable, and this difference becomes 
significantly larger starting in June 1928. This is evidence that the banks which failed earlier 
were those that had invested more in real estate loans as early as 1923. In other words, the 
share of mortgages at least partly explains not only the event of failure but also its timing. 
No other balance sheet item is as clearly graphically ordered as mortgage holdings (see 
Figures 4 and 6 in the last section, and Figures 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 in the Appendix). 
 
<Figure 3 about here> 
 
 
                                                          
23 Right skews are common in financial ratios. See Lev and Sunder (1979), Mcleay and Trigueiros (2002), and 
Tippett (1990)). I thank Mark Tippett for extensive statistical advice on the study of financial ratios. 
24 There is no decomposition of real estate loans on the books of Chicago state banks. 
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It is interesting to note that some of the banks that invested the least in real estate were also 
very large banks: in June 1929 Continental Illinois had .7 percent, Central Trust Company 
of Illinois around 2 percent, Harris Trust and Savings .05 percent, and the Northern Trust 
Company .7 percent.25 This in itself suggests the necessity of using a regression framework, 
which would allow me to test the importance of mortgages in predicting bank failure while 
controlling for other factors such as bank size. 
A simple way to do so is to introduce an ordered logistic model, which for this study 
presents several advantages over other estimation procedures. While in binary logistic 
models the outcome variable can only take one of two values (“survivor” or “failure”), 
ordered logistic regression allows the outcome variable to include several categories of 
failure, as well as the survivor one. And while a discrete-time hazard framework necessarily 
takes into account within (ie. post-1929) Depression variables, ordered logistic models 
allow me to focus exclusively on the impact of pre-Depression variables on the outcome.26 
This matters because external shocks may affect bank variables during the Depression, 
whereas ex ante variables are more likely to reflect banks’ pre-Depression portfolio 
decisions, which are the subject of this study. I report discrete-time hazard estimations in the 
Appendix for reference. 
 
                                                          
25 See also the Appendix on bank size. One may also wonder how a non-increasing share of real estate to total 
assets may have substantially weakened banks. Mortgage growth rates are also shown. 
26 A discrete-time hazard model necessarily includes time-varying covariates up until the time of failure or 
censoring, which in this dataset occurred mainly during, not before, the Depression. Although it is in theory 
possible to test the significance of pre-Depression variables by adding interactions with time dummies, it is not 
possible to do so with this dataset as the hazard rate is very often zero prior to 1929. A hazard rate of zero 
means that time dummies will perfectly predict failure, which leads to such dummies being automatically 
omitted from the model. 
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<Table 3 about here> 
 
The dependent variable in the ordered logit model is thus an ordinal variable 
(failure_type) in which each category represents a bank’s failure type. The categories are 
ordered so that the first category is June 1931 failure (1), the second category is June 1932 
failure (2), the third category is June 1933 failure (3), and the last category is Survivor (4). 
Formally, I estimate a probabilistic model of bank failure such that 
 
failure_type = α + β1 size + β2 capital + β3 reserve_dep + β4 gvtbonds + β5 secloans  
+ β6 mortgages + β7 other_re + β8 otherloans + β9 bankhouse         (1) 
+ β10 rearnings + β11 age + ε 
 
where size is a value of bank size, capital is the capital ratio, reserve_dep is the reserve-
deposit ratio, gvtbonds is the share of U.S. government bonds, secloans represents loans on 
security collateral (short-term loans backed by stock-market securities), mortgages is the 
share of real estate loans, other_re is the share of repossessed real estate after foreclosure, 
otherloans is the share of other loans, bankhouse is the share banking house, furniture and 
fixtures (bank expenses), rearnings is retained earnings to net worth (a common measure of 
bank profitability),27 and age is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank already existed in 
May 1920 and zero otherwise. A detailed description of each variable can be found in Table 
3. 
 
                                                          
27 On 1929 financial statements retained earnings appear in the form of “undivided profits” or “the volume of 
recognized accumulated profits which have not yet been paid out in dividends.” See Rodkey (1944, p. 108) 
and Van Hoose (2010, p. 12). 
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<Table 4 about here> 
 
Table 4 presents the results for this model, in odds ratios. Each column represents a 
separate regression in which predictors are restricted to one particular year. For instance, the 
1923 column helps find out which 1923 variables best predict failure during the Depression. 
Clearly, many ratios predict failure quite well throughout the pre-Depression period. 
In particular, government bonds, other loans and especially retained earnings to net worth 
significantly each reduce the likelihood of failure. The relative importance of the latter is 
also illustrated in Figure 11 in the Appendix, which is quite reminiscent of that of real estate 
loans, and is interesting in that the last failing cohort behaves quite differently from 
survivors after 1926. 
Of greater interest is the role of the real estate loan share. This variable stands out as 
the most important overall. Already in December 1923, for a one percent increase in the 
proportion of mortgages to total assets, the odds of surviving versus failing (all failure 
categories combined) were .94 times lower, holding other variables constant in the model.28 
This coefficient retains its significant predictive power compared to all other variables 
throughout the 1920s, up to the eve of the Depression (June 1929). No other variable is as 
consistently significant as the real estate loan share throughout the period.29  
Note that in Chicago, depositors in theory could know which banks held the most in 
mortgages thanks to official publications of balance sheet summaries every six months. The 
                                                          
28 Recall that all ratio variables were multiplied by 100. This makes interpretation of the odds ratios more 
practical, as a one-unit increase in the explanatory variable can now be interpreted as a “one percent” increase 
in the original proportion. An odds ratio above one increases the likelihood of survival, whereas an odds ratio 
below one decreases it. 
29 The relative insignificance of other_re will be explained in more detail in the next section. 
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fact that differences in withdrawals did widen to some extent after June 1931 may be 
explained by a learning effect on the part of creditors. As creditors witnessed withdrawals 
and the failure of banks with the largest amounts of mortgages in the first episode, they 
withdrew more from banks with larger amounts of such assets subsequently. However this 
information effect cannot entirely explain, for instance, why survivors themselves ended up 
losing nearly 60 percent of their deposits. 
 
 
The role of mortgages 
 
The previous section established that widespread withdrawals affected all banks and that 
mortgage holdings predict the timing of bank failure. It remains to determine exactly how 
mortgage holdings led to failure. This could have happened either through mortgages’ 
quality or their inherent lack of liquidity, and there are three reasons to prefer the latter 
explanation. 
First, loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) for commercial bank mortgages at the time rarely 
exceeded 50 percent, which is particularly low by today's standards. In Chicago in 
particular, a survey conducted in 1925 indicates that the average LTV on residential 
properties varied from 41.3 percent to 50.5 percent (Bayless and Bodfish 1928).30 This has 
been emphasized by both Field (2014) and White (2014). Given that land values in Chicago 
did not fall by more than 50 percent until 1933, and that most Chicago banks failed before 
                                                          
30 See also Morton (1956). First mortgages on apartments encumbered by a second mortgage (the majority of 
cases for apartments) had an average LTV of 54.7 percent. In other cases (especially when apartments were 
not encumbered by a second mortgage) LTVs could go up to 59.9 percent. Interest rates on average reached 
around 6 percent (ibid.). 
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then (see Table 2), banks could not have made any substantial losses on these loans, even 
after foreclosure. Hoyt (1933, p. 399) documents the fall in land values, using sales and real 
estate brokers' opinions rather than assessments for tax purposes. He shows that values in 
Chicago as a whole fell by 5 percent in 1929, 20 percent in 1930, 38 percent in 1931, 50 
percent in 1932 and 60 percent in 1933. We cannot know whether the bulk of the “1933” 
decline occurred before or after the national bank holiday in March 1933. On p. 172 Hoyt 
actually asserts that “the decline in the value of improved properties from 1928 to 1933 was 
50 per cent,” not 60 per cent (Hoyt 1933). 
Second, Hoyt (1933, pp. 259, 267)’s geographical data on land values suggests that 
these were uncorrelated with bank failure rates. Although Hoyt’s land value variable is 
categorical, his maps are sufficiently detailed to allow efficient matching with my balance 
sheet data. Using banks’ contemporary addresses in Chicago, I thus generated a new 
categorical variable, valuefall, which includes three categories of cumulative fall in 
residential land values per front foot from 1926 to 1931 (from lowest to highest) in each 
bank’s location.31  As mentioned earlier, most banks catered to their own neighbourhoods, 
so that land values in their own location would likely have had the highest impact on their 
health. Hoyt chose 1931 to illustrate the geographical pattern of falls in land values in the 
city because this was when the first sharp decline in values occurred (ibid., p. 266). It is 
reasonable to assume that subsequent falls in land values followed the initial geographical 
pattern in terms of differences in intensity. 
 
                                                          
31 This variable was generated using the two maps shown in Figures 42 and 47 in Hoyt (1933, pp. 259, 267). 
For these maps he used sales data from Olcott's Land Values Black Book of Chicago and land assessment data 
from Jacob (1931). These maps are divided into grids, and a bank’s location is one of the 219 squares on each 
grid. Each square's size is about 2.5 squared kilometres. 
21 
 
<Table 5 about here> 
 
Table 5 shows the percent of banks in each cohort by category of value decline. 
There are few differences within the three failing cohorts, so that falls in land values do not 
point to any possible correlation between falls in land values between 1926 and 1931 and 
those cohorts’ timing of failure. In addition, although survivors seem to have experienced 
less of a decline in values than all other cohorts together, many survivors were very large 
banks from the Loop, where land values were more stable throughout the period. 
Controlling for size may therefore be important when assessing the role of land value falls. 
More generally, should there be any relationship between land values and bank failures, it 
may not be a directly causal one: locations experiencing a larger fall in land values may also 
be areas in which banks simply made larger amounts of mortgages in the 1920s, which may 
lead land values to be related to bank failures only indirectly and not through loan losses. 
Controlling for other financial ratios may therefore also be important. Table 6 reports 
estimates of the same ordered logistic model as before, only with 1929 balance sheet 
variables on the right-hand side and the added valuefall variable.  In the second column, this 
variable is interacted with mortgages to see whether declines in land values had a stronger 
effect on banks that had invested more in real estate loans. Neither the valuefall variable nor 
its interaction term are significant. 
 
<Table 6 about here> 
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A simple t-test reveals that deposit losses among all cohorts are uncorrelated with 
falls in land values. This holds for deposit losses up to December 1930 (Prob > F = 0.701) 
as well as for deposit losses up to December 1931 (Prob > F = 0.080). 
The fact that banks' losses did not have a large impact on bank failure can also be 
seen in the low predictive power of capital ratios throughout the period (see Table 4). As 
Figure 4 suggests, June 1931 failures had the highest ratio of capital to total assets through 
most of the 1920s, despite being the first cohort to fail. 
 
<Figure 4 about here> 
 
The third and final reason to favour liquidity over quality as an explanation of bank 
failures is that mortgages were particularly difficult to liquidate. In the interwar period 
mortgages could neither be sold in the secondary market nor rediscounted at the Federal 
Reserve. In early 1932 the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) proposed to lend 
against “ineligible” collateral, which could include high quality real estate loans. 
Nevertheless loans against such assets remained proportionately small because the RFC 
preferred loans with maturities of fewer than six months (Calomiris, Mason, Weidenmier, 
and Bobroff  2013) and refused to lend against real estate loans’ book value, likely taking 
into account their uncertain quality paramount to their long maturity (Wigmore 1995, p. 
324). In general the RFC remained very cautious and lent against mainly high-quality and 
liquid collateral, until 1933 when it switched to preferred stock purchases in financial 
institutions (Calomiris and Mason 2004; Calomiris et al. 2013; James 1938; Mason 2001).32 
                                                          
32 In addition, around the same time the Banking Act of 1932 also allowed the Federal Reserve to widen its 
accepted collateral for rediscounts. According to Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 45), however, such powers 
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A more fundamental cause of the illiquidity of mortgages was their long contract 
maturity relative to other loans, usually between three and five years. Their de facto 
maturity in the 1920s was even longer as it was customary for banks to renew mortgages. 
As Saulnier made clear in his 1956 study of 1920s mortgage lending in the United States, 
“the much lauded feature of full repayment by maturity has been won at the price of 
extended maturities” (see Morton (1956, p. 8) and Chapman and Willis (1934, p. 602)).33 
This created strong expectations of renewal on the part of borrowers. After three or five 
years, having only made the initial down payments and interest payments, they expected to 
be given another three to five years to make the final “balloon” payment. An informed 
commentator from the 1950s gave a vivid description of the phenomenon: 
 
What usually happened was that the average family went along, budgeting for the interest 
payments on the mortgage, subconsciously regarding the mortgage itself as written for an 
indefinite period, as if the lender were never going to want his money back (...). This 
impression was strengthened by the fact that lenders most frequently did renew the mortgage 
over and over again when money was plentiful (Federal Home Loan Bank Board 1952, pp. 2-
5). 
 
While many loans were made in the boom years of 1925 to 1927 (see Figure 5), 
those maturing between 1929 and 1930 were likely renewed and would not actually come 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
were used only to a very limited extent, perhaps for the same reason. See also Mason (2001) and Wicker 
(1996, p.85). 
33 Note that Morton’s data come from an NBER survey of urban mortgage lending, whose absolute precision 
may be taken with care. The survey was made in 1947 on a sample of 170 surviving commercial banks of all 
sizes, “representing about one-third of the commercial banks’ total nonfarm mortgage portfolio as of mid-
1945” (ibid., p. 71). 
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due before 1932-35.34 Loans maturing for the first time during the Depression would come 
up for expected renewal, and banks under liquidity pressure would urge unprepared 
borrowers to pay back their loans. Both cases could create a liquidity shortage, and in the 
latter, banks may have even been induced to foreclose. 
Foreclosure likely would not entail any significant loss thanks to the 50 percent 
LTV. After foreclosure either the property could be auctioned off to external buyers or, if 
there were no buyers, the property was repossessed by the bank at an appraisal price. Such 
repossessed property then sat on the bank's books as non-performing assets (called “other 
real estate”) until they could be sold again later. The foreclosure price could potentially be 
lower than the current “market” price. Nevertheless in Depression Chicago transactions 
were few, foreclosures widespread (Hoyt 1933, pp. 266-72), and sales prices were probably 
themselves affected by foreclosures in surrounding areas (this theoretical point is made by 
Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak (2011); see also Genesove and Mayer (2001)). This suggests 
that gaps between foreclosure and sales prices may not have been very large. 
The problem with foreclosures lay elsewhere: the foreclosure process in Illinois 
lasted more than eighteen months on average (Child 1925; Gries and Ford 1932; Hoppe 
1926; Johnson 1923).35 As the vice-president of the banking department of the First 
National Trust and Savings Bank in Chicago put it: 
 
As to retaining homes, I have heard a lot of talk about foreclosures and that the banks are 
calling loans and insisting upon repayment and that the borrowers are unable to refund 
elsewhere, and they are doing this because they are trying to keep their assets liquid. In our 
                                                          
34 See in particular Morton (1956, p. 174). 
35 See also Anderson (1927), Hopper (1927), Stalker (1925), and Postel-Vinay (2014b). While there is no data 
on foreclosure rates, Hoyt (1933, pp. 269-70) remarks that “foreclosures were mounting rapidly, the number 
increasing from 5,818 in 1930 to 10,075 in 1931 (...), [and] reached a new peak in 1932, rising to (...) 15,201.” 
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State it takes us, at a minimum, 18 months to foreclose a loan, and it will probably be closer to 
two years and a half, before we acquire title. We are certainly not maintaining our liquid 
condition by foreclosing loans” (U.S. Congress 1932, part 2, p. 269). 
 
Corroborating evidence can be found in Federal Home Loan Bank Board (1934), 
which mentions “the dangers attendant on the mortgagee's refusal to renew,” and in Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board (1952), which reports: “The time of stress came in 1929-30; the 
short-term mortgage came to maturity against a situation of tight credit and, in many cases, 
of no credit (...). All too often the lender (...) did not want to renew the loan to the home-
owner no matter how high the premium or rate of interest.”36  
 
<Figure 5 about here> 
     
<Figure 6 about here> 
 
Long maturities and long foreclosure times posed a tremendous challenge to banks. 
Their effect on bank balance sheets can be seen in Figures 3, 6 and 12. Figure 3 showed how 
real estate loans increased as a share of total assets for all banks during the Depression, at 
the same time as assets as a whole were diminishing.37 By contrast, other types of loans 
were promptly liquidated in this period. Figure 6 shows the falling share of loans on 
collateral security owned by banks, while Figure 12 in the Appendix shows a similar decline 
                                                          
36 Note, in addition, that second mortgage financing made prompt repayment even less likely -- see Postel-
Vinay (2014b). 
37 For a graph of total assets see Figure 14 in the Appendix. 
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in other loans as a share of total assets.38 Compared to other assets, therefore, mortgages 
were particularly difficult to liquidate.39  
The fate of the variable “other real estate” may seem inconsistent with this 
conclusion. Other real estate is an asset consisting of property repossessed by banks after 
real estate foreclosures and before it can be resold. One might question the importance of 
this variable in explaining bank failures given the very low percentages shown in Figure 13 
in the Appendix, which never go much beyond 3 percent, and given the low significance of 
this variable in the ordered logit model. This can be explained, first, by the fact that 
mortgages' impact on bank failure could have been strong without any foreclosures taking 
place. When foreclosures did occur, it is precisely their very lengthy process that would 
have created liquidity problems for banks. Each cohort's last data point represents its status 
at the last call before failure, and each call occurred only every six months. This means that 
if many banks failed between April and June, which was the case for the first two failing 
cohorts, it is likely that much of their repossessed property would not have been recorded by 
December before this date. Thus, the lengthy foreclosure process increases the odds that 
                                                          
38 Security loans were usually used to carry securities and were repayable at the option of the lender within 
twenty-four hours’ notice, with the securities themselves used as collateral. According to Bogen and Willis 
(1929, p. 245), “depositors can, and sometimes do, determine the calling of loans by the activity of their own 
demands.” Other loans were short-term commercial loans, often sought by companies for the seasonal 
expansion of their inventories. Both types of loans were eligible for rediscount at the Federal Reserve Banks or 
could be sold in the open market (Bogen and Willis 1929; U.S. Congress 1927). 
39 Surprisingly perhaps, cash is not a good predictor of failure. This suggests that cash ratios were relatively 
similar for all four cohorts, and that what really differentiated them were their mortgage holdings. Government 
bonds were more important than cash, as can be seen in Table 4 and Figure 8 in the Appendix. 
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many of the effects of foreclosure are not visible on this graph (Child 1925; Hoppe 1926; 
Johnson 1923).40 
 
Conclusion 
 
This study of the long-term behaviour of Chicago banks in the 1920s has yielded new 
insights into the causes of bank failures in the 1930s. I have argued that banks’ long-term 
investments in illiquid assets (especially mortgages) severely weakened their position when 
they faced large withdrawals on their deposits. Though restricted to Chicago, these results 
reassert the role that liquidity issues played in the Great Depression, both on the liability and 
the asset sides of the balance sheet. More specifically, they suggest that a solvent but ex ante 
less liquid bank is not necessarily healthy, and that liquidity risk management is just as 
important as credit risk management when the risk of bank runs is greater than zero. 
This paper has also reassessed the role that mortgage investments played in the Great 
Depression via the banking channel. Parallels with the recent crisis may be drawn, despite 
major differences in mortgage contracts then and now. In both cases, banks suffered 
tremendous liquidity shocks on the uninsured liability side of their balance sheets. These 
shocks highlighted the impact of maturity mismatches between long-term assets and short-
term liabilities (Brunnermeier 2008; Gorton and Metrick 2012). Securitization can 
potentially increase the liquidity of mortgages by making them more salable and by 
distributing different kinds of risks to different types of investors. But securitization needs to 
be undertaken in the right way (see Postel-Vinay (2014a)). 
Central banks can in theory help during a liquidity crisis by following Bagehot's rule 
and lending on good collateral. Although central banks play an essential role during crises, it 
                                                          
40 Further comments on the value of repossessed property after foreclosure are made earlier in this sub-section. 
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is always difficult for them to gauge the precise quality (credit risk) of an asset -- especially 
if the asset is a long-term one, thereby creating more uncertainty about its long-term value 
(Goodhart 2008, 2010). By lending against such doubtful collateral as mortgage-backed 
securities, the Federal Reserve has had a controversial role in the recent crisis (Bordo and 
Landon-Lane 2010; Schleifer and Vishny 2011; Gorton and Metrick 2013; Stein 2013).41 
Because central bank help will likely never be entirely adequate, it is important for 
commercial banks to attend to the inherent liquidity of their portfolios. Of course, nowadays 
assets’ liquidity increasingly depends on their underlying quality as their tradeability varies 
with their perceived quality. Nevertheless some assets, especially longer-term ones, are still 
inherently less liquid than others either because of the slow underlying cash flow itself or 
because of the uncertainty attached to their long maturity.  
No bank will ever be perfectly hedged in terms of its maturity profile, but promoting 
liquidity in a preventive regulatory framework, perhaps through countercyclical cash ratios, 
would be a good start. In this paper, cash did not matter in the sense that differences in 
mortgage holdings made a larger difference. But we may conjecture that, had banks holding 
more mortgages also held more cash, they would not have responded so badly to bank 
runs.42 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
41 And by purchasing such securities outright, it cut across the boundary between monetary and fiscal policy 
(Reinhart 2011). 
42 Note that government bonds mattered more than cash, as can be seen in Table 4 and Figure 8 in the 
Appendix. See also Calomiris, Heider, and Hoerova (2012), Goodhart (2008, 2010) and Shin (2009). 
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Appendix 
 
Sources, name changes and consolidations 
 
This study uses the Statements of State Banks of Illinois. The Reports of Condition from the 
Office of the Comptroller of Currency focus on all member banks (both state and national) 
nationwide at disaggregated levels, and contain very detailed information on individual 
banks, including qualitative information. For my study these reports would have proved 
insufficient: the extant reports for state member banks are available for the same dates as the 
Statements and are less complete since they include only state member banks, and for 
national member banks the only available reports are for December 1929 and December 
1931.43 There are no reports for 1930, which is an important year for this research. Focusing 
on state banks should not be a problem since in December 1929 state banks made up 95.5 
percent of all banks in the city (University of Illinois Bulletin 1929) and 87.6 percent of all 
suspensions, whereas national banks accounted for only 12.4 percent of suspensions (White 
1984). 
Creating cohorts is an essential way of keeping track of the same sample of banks, 
whether failures or survivors (aside from its advantages for economic analysis). Another 
essential feature of this aim is linked to name changes and consolidations. As previously 
mentioned, I had all the data needed for this purpose. Name changes were corrected in 26 
instances. However, I still had to make decisions about whether to include a merger or 
acquisition in the failing or surviving categories. Most authors include such consolidations 
as failures; that is, a bank that was taken over is usually considered a failure, and so are both 
of the banks that merged, even when the merger itself ended up surviving the Depression. 
                                                          
43 Details of the available volumes are described in Mason (1998). 
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For instance, Calomiris and Mason (2003) specify that their data “contain almost seventy 
different ways a bank can exit the dataset, ranging from all imaginable types of mergers and 
acquisitions to relatively simple voluntary liquidations and receiverships; [...] together, we 
term [them] failures.” The Reports of Condition they used were more detailed in this 
respect, and I do not have data on “all types of mergers and acquisitions.” Nevertheless, the 
Rand McNally directory gives sufficient detail at least on whether a merger or a simple 
takeover occurred.  
As in Calomiris and Mason (2003) I thought reasonable to count as failures banks 
that were taken over by other banks. This occurred in 14 cases since June 1929. The banks 
that were taken over before June 1929 are not taken into account in the sense that only the 
resulting consolidation should be part of a cohort. Exactly the same applies to pre-June 1929 
mergers: only the resulting merger can be part of a cohort and thus only this bank will be 
tracked down as early as possible in the 1920s. Table 7 shows the state mergers that 
occurred since June 1929 and whether the merger ended up failing or not.  
 
<Table 7 about here> 
 
For the mergers that had failed by June 1933, there is no apparent dilemma regarding 
how to classify the original consolidating banks. That is, when a merger ended up failing, 
the two original banks' data could be kept until they merge under a new name, at which 
point the new merger's data could be excluded from the dataset, making the two original 
banks failures at the time of consolidation. Yet this decision sounds slightly arbitrary given 
the fact that a healthy bank may have merged with a less healthy bank which may have 
dragged the former into bankruptcy. In the first and third cases shown in Table7, it was 
actually possible to divide the merger's balance sheet in two proportional parts and make the 
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two original banks continue until the time the merger itself fails. In the second case, the 
merger itself fails in August 1930 so could not be part of any cohort. Results are robust to 
different categorizations. 
In the dataset only one state merger actually survived in Chicago: the Central 
Republic Bank and Trust Co, a July 1931 consolidation of Central Trust Co of Illinois, 
Chicago Trust Co and a national bank, the National Bank of the Republic. As in the 
previous cases, it was decided that both state banks would be kept “alive” by taking the 
items on the balance sheet of the new merger and splitting them into parts proportional to 
each original bank’s share of the total.44 
Finally, it seems necessary to specifically discuss the case of the Continental Illinois 
Bank and Trust Company, which was the largest bank in Chicago in 1929, and which with 
the First National Bank (as its name indicates, a national bank) “towered over the Chicago 
money market like giants” (James 1938, p. 952). Together they were responsible for about 
half the business transacted in the city (ibid.). Initially this bank was not included in the 
sample, for the simple reason that it apparently failed in December 1932 and thus could not 
be part of a particular cohort. However, it was soon discovered that the “failure” of the bank 
was in fact due to a rare phenomenon at the time: the fact that it adopted a national charter. 
The Chicago Tribune titled in October 1932 “CONTINENTAL GETS NATIONAL BANK 
CHARTER” which was at the time seen as a strange kind of event (Chicago Tribune, 1932). 
One of the reasons this happened, as the article explained, is that national banking laws were 
in the process of being changed to allow branching everywhere, including in states that 
                                                          
44 But again the results are robust either way. Calomiris and Mason (1997) emphasize that “Central Republic 
was a solvent bank saved from failure by the collective intervention of other Loop banks.” This can be 
considered as controversial however, as several sources point to political motives for its rescue (see in 
particular Vickers (2011)). I also thank Joseph Mason for kindly making national bank data available to me. 
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technically forbade it. As the crisis made clear to some bank managers the potential benefits 
of branching, it is not surprising that a strong bank like Continental Illinois sought a national 
charter, and was granted one.45 The bank was thus manually categorised as a survivor. 
 
Deposit losses 
 
Table 8 reports tests of differences between mean deposit growth rates. 
 
<Table 8 about here> 
 
 
 
 Additional financial ratios 
 
Figures 7, 8, 9 10, 11, 12 and 13 show the reserve-deposit ratio, U.S. government bonds, 
banking house, borrowed funds, retained earnings to net worth, other loans and other real 
estate. The relative importance of government bonds, which was also noted in Table 4, can 
likely be explained by its important role in liquidity maintenance during crises. 
 
<Figure 7 about here> 
 
<Figure 8 about here> 
                                                          
45 The adjective “strong” here is based on the fact that Continental Illinois in June 1929 had healthier ratios 
than even the average of survivors. I do not know of any other state banks in Chicago which adopted a national 
charter at that time. 
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<Figure 9 about here> 
 
<Figure 10 about here> 
 
<Figure 11 about here> 
 
<Figure 12 about here> 
 
Bills payable and rediscounts are a form of long-term, high interest debt, which is a good 
indicator of bank trouble, as when deposits are withdrawn from risky banks, they are forced 
to rely on high-cost debt (Calomiris and Mason 1997). Figure 10 thus shows banks’ race for 
liquidity as they started losing deposits. In December 1931, for instance, when survivors lost 
slightly fewer deposits than the June 1932 Failures, they also secured fewer funds from 
these sources. Note however that the interpretation of this variable is not straightforward, as 
it could also reflect creditors’ confidence (or lack thereof) in the bank.46 
 
Discrete-time hazard estimates 
 
Table 9 reports estimates of discrete time hazard models. As mentioned above, survival 
models necessarily take into account within-Depression covariates and therefore cannot test 
the importance of pre-Depression variables as well as ordered logit can. Adding time 
dummies with interactions could potentially help, but with this particular dataset the hazard 
                                                          
46 As a side note, the June 1932 spike for survivors and late failures may be due to a Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation (RFC) plan to inject liquidity during the June 1932 crisis (Calomiris and Mason 1997). 
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rate is frequently zero in pre-Depression years, so that pre-Depression effects cannot be 
efficiently estimated (time dummies are automatically omitted). 
Nevertheless the results are of some interest. Both models are discrete-time 
proportional odds (logit) models, chosen among other survival frameworks (such as 
continuous time survival models) due to the frequency of the data, which is halfyearly.  
If  T is survival time and T = t the time of failure, then the discrete hazard for this model is: 
 
 
𝜆( 𝑡 ∣ 𝑥 ) = 𝑃( 𝑇 = 𝑡 ∣ 𝑇 ≥ 𝑡, 𝑥 ) =
exp (𝛽𝑡 +  𝛾𝑋)
1 + exp (𝛽𝑡 +  𝛾𝑋)
 
 
 
where β is the baseline hazard, X a vector of explanatory variables and γ a vector of 
variable-specific parameters. 
The first model in Table 9 assumes a constant baseline hazard, which may not be 
wholly adapted to the dataset since the hazard rate greatly increased as the Depression 
unfolded. For this reason a second model, assuming positive time duration, is estimated in 
the second column. The time variable is very significant, and the McFadden R-squared 
much higher, suggesting that this model is a better fit than the previous one. Odds ratios are 
reported, which in such models can be interpreted as hazard ratios. Hazard ratios between 
zero and one decrease the probability of failure; hazard ratios above one increase it. 
 
 
<Table 9 about here> 
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In this model it can be seen that many variables are significant -- more so than in the ordered 
logit models. This could be interpreted as a sign that the Depression exacerbated differences 
between banks. The most powerful variable, however, remains mortgages to total asset, with 
a hazard ratio of 1.084. 
 
Problems with unit banking 
 
In the 1920s all Chicago state banks operated under the unit banking system; they were not 
allowed to open branches as Illinois banking law forbade it. Problems linked to unit banking 
were numerous. The main reason branch banking is usually thought of as an advantage is 
that it increases portfolio diversification. Branch banking can be contrasted to group or 
chain-banking as branches of the same bank can pool their assets and liabilities together. 
When there is a liquidity shortage at one of the banks in a chain, other member banks cannot 
simply transfer funds to that bank for help, a problem which does not even arise in the 
branch banking system. This may partly explain the collapse of the Bain chain in June 1931 
which triggered the banking crisis at that time (James 1938, p. 994).  
Yet the lack of portfolio diversification was not necessarily directly due to the unit 
banking system. Indeed, Rodkey points to the fact that many small bankers prior to the 
Depression felt a moral duty to “meet all demands for good local loans” (Rodkey, 1944, p. 
4). It also seems that the lack of portfolio diversification was not the only disadvantage of 
unit banking. Rodkey blamed this system for fostering the incompetence of bank managers:  
 
 
 This system leads naturally to a multiplicity of small banks under local control, owned locally, 
and operated usually by citizens of the home community who may or may not have some 
knowledge of the fundamental principles of sound banking (Rodkey 1935, p. 147).  
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Thus, by triggering the establishment of many small banks, unit banking made it easier 
for inexperienced bankers to become managers.47 Rodkey also pointed out that little 
attention was given to the ability of the borrower to meet his interest payments (ibid., p. 
122). 
The ease with which almost any kind of manager could open a small community 
bank and the resulting lack of experience of such unit bank managers in Illinois stand out as 
potentially serious problems when the Chicago mortgage boom is taken into account.  
 
Bank size 
 
This appendix deals with the problem of bank size. First of all, it should be noted 
that bank size is not necessarily a problem in the sense that it does not necessarily introduce 
bias in the results. Most of the time it does not because authors make a point of studying 
mainly financial ratios. When looking at the main indicators of bank size (total assets, total 
capital, and sometimes total deposits), it appears that larger banks did tend to have a higher 
survivor rate. However, one of the aims of this paper is precisely to show that this was 
certainly not the only reason for their survival (of course, it may be that there is a correlation 
                                                          
47 Nevertheless, the debate on branch banking has not completely ended. So far, at least four studies have 
shown that the branch banking system was detrimental to bank survival during the Depression. While 
Calomiris and Wheelock (1995) concede that it has usually been a good thing in U.S. history, they find that 
such was not the case in the Great Depression. Some of the largest branching networks collapsed in the 1930s, 
which may have been due to a form of moral hazard: branching banks thought they were better protected 
against local risk, and thus were less careful with their asset management (see also Carlson (2001)). Calomiris 
and Mason (2003) confirm the negative effect of branch banking, and so does Carlson (2001). On the other 
hand, Mitchener (2005) finds a positive effect, while Gambs (1977) finds no effect at all.   
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between larger bank size and better management practice). Table 10 shows the failure rate 
per size group, using the whole population of 193 banks (see notes below Table 2). 
 
<Table 10> 
 
<Figure 14 about here> 
 
From this table it appears that there is indeed a relationship between size and failure, 
although this relationship is not very strong. True, whether large or small, banks had a high 
failure rate, always above 70 percent. Nevertheless, it is still noticeable that banks with less 
than $250,000 in capital had 89 percent chances of failing, whereas banks whose capital 
went beyond $800,000 “only” had a failure rate of 73 percent. Looking at total assets for the 
whole period, the differences are even more striking (see Figure 14).  
 
Mortgage growth rates 
 
One may wonder how a non-increasing share of real estate to total assets may have 
substantially weakened banks. First note that the data only start in 1923, which was already 
some way into the boom. The real estate boom may also be hidden by the fact that banks 
grew significantly throughout the 1920s. This is shown in Figures 15 and 16. Figure 15 
represents the median growth rate of mortgages as an absolute value, a useful (albeit highly 
approximate) measure in the absence of data on new mortgages made by year. It shows 
substantial growth rates between 1923 and 1927 for all cohorts, as well as the fact that June 
1931 failures always had a higher growth rate than June 1932 failures, which had a higher 
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growth rate than survivors (the June 1933 failures cohort, in light grey for better visibility, 
behaves much more erratically, as is often the case). 
The graph of the median growth rate of total assets looks similar (see Figure 16), 
although most cohorts had a slightly higher mortgage than asset growth rate. It is interesting 
to see that the June 1931 failure cohort grew particularly fast in the mid-1920s.  
 
<Figure 15 about here> 
 
<Figure 16 about here> 
 
 
 
 Survival model for the liability side 
 
Table 11 provides a discrete-time proportional odds model for the liability side of bank 
balance sheets. The focus is on the years 1929-1933. As borrowed funds and deposit losses 
are highly correlated, they were entered separately in the regression. All items are ratios to 
total liabilities and equity except for retained earnings to net worth. 
 
<Table 11 about here> 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Classification of Great Depression Cohorts 
 
Bank 
existed? 
June 
1929 
Dec 
1929 
Jun 
1930 
Dec 
1930 
Jun 
1931 
Dec 
1931 
Jun 
1932 
Dec 
1932 
Jun 
1933 
Survivors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
June 1931 
failures 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No 
June 1932 
failures 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
June 1933 
failures 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Source: Statements. 
 
 
Table 2: Survivors and failures 
 
 Number of 
Survivors 
Number of 
June 1931 
Failures 
Number of 
June 1932 
Failures 
Number of 
June 1933 
Failures 
Failure 
Rate (as % 
of the 
1932 
banks 
existing in 
June 1929) 
Compound 
Failure 
Rate 
Dec 1923 28 28 27 7   
Dec 1924 30 37 31 8   
June 1925 31 38 30 8   
June 1926 32 39 34 9   
June 1927 31 40 34 9   
June 1928 33 44 36 11   
Dec 1928 31 41 35 12   
June 1929 35 46 36 14 0 0 
Dec 1929 35 46 36 14 7 7 
June 1930 35 46 36 14 6 12 
Dec 1930 35 46 36 14 7 19 
June 1931 35 46 36 14 24 43 
Dec 1931 35 46 36 14 10 53 
June 1932 35 46 36 14 18 72 
Dec 1932 35 46 36 14 3 74 
June 1933 35 46 36 14 9 83 
Notes: The 193 banks in total for June 1929 mentioned in the sixth column and in the introduction include 
those that are not part of any cohort, eg. those that failed between the chosen windows of failure. The actual 
bank total for June 1929 as the sum of each cohort is 131. Source: Statements. 
 
 
Table 3: Variable definitions 
 
Variable Description 
failure_type ordinal dependent variable (1: June 1931 
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failure; 2: June 1932 failure; 3: June 1933 
failure; 4: Survivor) 
size log (total assets) 
capital capital / total assets 
reserve_dep (cash balances + due from other banks) / 
(demand deposits + time deposits + due to 
other banks) 
gvtbds  government bonds / total assets 
secloans  loans on security collateral / total assets 
mortgages real estate loans (all categories) / total assets 
other_re other real estate / total assets 
otherloans other loans / total assets 
bankhouse banking house / total assets 
rearnings retained earnings / total capital 
age dummy 1 = existed in May 1920; 0 = did not 
exist in May 1920 
Notes: All variables except for size and age have been multiplied by 100 to ease interpretation of the odds 
ratios. The variable mortgages contains both residential and commercial mortgages as no decomposition was 
available on the original bank statements. 
 
 
Table 4: Ordered logistic model of bank failure (odds ratios), 1923-1929 (dependent 
variable: failure_type) 
 
 Dec 
1923 
Dec 
19254 
Jun 
1925 
Jun 
1926 
Jun 
1927 
Jun 
1928 
Dec 
1928 
Jun 
1929 
size 1.620 
(.56) 
1.421 
(.43) 
1.207 
(.29) 
1.70** 
(.49) 
1.569 
(.46) 
1.206 
(.31) 
1.120 
(.28) 
1.196 
(.27) 
capital 1.027 
(.06) 
.978 
(.04) 
1.059 
(.04) 
1.026 
(.04) 
1.051 
(.04) 
1.057 
(.04) 
1.056 
(.04) 
1.020 
(.04) 
reserve_dep 1.036 
(.05) 
1.036 
(.04) 
1.059 
(.04) 
.988 
(.03) 
.935 
(.04) 
.965 
(.04) 
.970 
(.02) 
1.007 
(.02) 
gvtbonds 1.070* 
(.04) 
1.044 
(.04) 
1.070* 
(.04) 
1.046 
(.05) 
1.048 
(.05) 
1.070 
(.06) 
1.061 
(.05) 
1.141** 
(.06) 
secloans .987 
(.03) 
1.020 
(.03) 
1.025 
(.03) 
.999 
(.02) 
1.035 
(.02) 
1.030 
(.02) 
1.044** 
(.02) 
1.023 
(.02) 
mortgages .937** 
(.03) 
.928** 
(.03) 
.951* 
(.03) 
.919*** 
(.03) 
.940** 
(.03) 
.940** 
(.03) 
.930** 
(.03) 
.927*** 
(.03) 
other_re .985 
(.12) 
1.037 
(.09) 
.937 
(.12) 
.560** 
(.15) 
.477* 
(.20) 
.670 
(.23) 
.568 
(.24) 
.776 
(.18) 
otherloans 1.012 
(.02) 
.971 
(.02) 
.969* 
(.02) 
.978 
(.02) 
.951** 
(.02) 
.973 
(.02) 
.938** 
(.02) 
1.003 
(.02) 
bankhouse .961 
(.08) 
1.000 
(.08) 
.939 
(.07) 
1.072 
(.05) 
.992 
(.07) 
.922 
(.06) 
.940 
(.05) 
1.003 
(.06) 
rearnings .995 
(.03) 
1.030 
(.03) 
1.025 
(.03) 
1.057** 
(.03) 
1.068** 
(.03) 
1.035 
(.02) 
1.036 
(.03) 
1.060** 
(.03) 
age .828 
(.49) 
1.103 
(.55) 
1.334 
(.64) 
1.294 
(.64) 
1.664 
(.80) 
2.189* 
(1.00) 
3.249** 
(1.55) 
1.290 
(.55) 
N 
Prob > chi2 
86 
.006 
102 
.000 
103 
.000 
111 
.000 
112 
.000 
122 
.000 
116 
.000 
128 
.000 
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Likelihood -98.78 -
109.87 
-
111.91 
-119.98 -116.85 -
135.62 
-125.21 -140.32 
 
Notes: *** significant at α = 0.01, ** significant at α = 0.05, * significant at α = 0.10. The dependent variable 
(failure_type) is an ordinal one, ordered in the following way: 1. June 1931 failure; 2. June 1932 failure; 3. 
June 1933 failure; 4. Survivor. Each column represents a separate model run with variables taken each year 
before the start of the Depression. The table shows odds ratios, with standard errors based on the original 
coefficients in parentheses. An odds ratio above one increases the likelihood of survival, whereas an odds ratio 
below one decreases it. Each variable except for size and age has been multiplied by 100 so that a one unit 
increase can be interpreted as a one percentage increase in the ratio. Source: Statements. 
 
 
 
Table 5: Percentage of banks by cohort falling into one of the three categories of cumulative 
value decline from 1926 to 1931 (lowest to highest) 
 
Fall in land 
values 
June 1931 
Failures 
June 1932  
Failures 
June 1933 Failures Survivors 
0 36.96 28.57 30.77 45.45 
1 58.70 68.57 38.46 48.48 
2 4.35 2.86 30.77 6.06 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: Hoyt (1933, pp. 259, 267) and Statements. 
 
 
 
Table 6: Ordered logistic model of bank failure (odds ratios), (dependent variable: 
failure_type; explanatory variables: June 1929 balance sheet items and valuefall) 
 
 (1) (2) 
size 1.190 
(.27) 
1.166 
(.27) 
capital 1.011 
(.03) 
1.001 
(.04) 
reserve_dep 1.009 
(.02) 
1.006 
(.02) 
gvtbonds 1.149** 
(.07) 
1.153** 
(.07) 
secloans 1.028 
(.02) 
1.025 
(.02) 
other_re .797 
(.19) 
.809 
(.19) 
otherloans .985 
(.02) 
.987 
(.02) 
bankhouse 1.003 
(.06) 
1.010 
(.06) 
rearnings 1.262** 
(.54) 
1.057** 
(.03) 
age 1.262 
(.54) 
1.244 
(.50) 
mortgages .927*** 
(.03) 
.897*** 
(.04) 
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valuefall 1.069 
(.35) 
.540 
(.37) 
mortgages*valuefall  1.045 
(.04) 
N 
Prob > chi2 
Likelihood 
126 
.000 
-136.83 
126 
.000 
-136.17 
 
Notes: The variable valuefall is a categorical variable consisting in three categories of intensity in cumulative 
falls in land values from 1926 to 1931 based on Hoyt (1933), from lowest to highest (see text for further details 
on the computation of this variable). *** significant at α = 0.01, ** significant at α = 0.05, * significant at α = 
0.10. Odds ratios with standard errors based on the original coefficients in parentheses. An odds ratio above 
one increases the likelihood of survival, whereas an odds ratio below one decreases it. Each ratio variable has 
been multiplied by 100 so that a one unit increase can be interpreted as a one percentage increase in the ratio. 
Source: Statements. 
 
 
Table 7: State mergers between June 1929 and June 1933 
 
Bank 1 Bank 2 New merger First reporting 
date 
Failing? 
The Foreman 
Trust and 
Savings Bank 
State Bank Foreman-State 
Trust and 
Savings Bank 
Dec 1929 Yes, June 1931 
Roosevelt State 
Bank 
Bankers State 
Bank 
Roosevelt-
Bankers State 
Bank 
June 1930 Yes, Aug 1930 
Builders and 
Merchants State 
Bank 
Capital State 
Savings Bank 
Builders and 
Merchants Bank 
and Trust Co 
Nov 1930 Yes, April 1931 
Central Trust 
Co of Illinois 
Chicago Trust 
Co 
Central 
Republic Bank 
and Trust Co 
July 1931 No 
Sources: Statements, and Rand Mc Nally Bankers' Directory.  
 
 
Table 8: Tests of differences between mean deposit growth rates 
 
 Survivors  June 
1931 
 June 1932  June 1933 
 (1) (2) (3)  (1)  (1) (2)  (1) (2) (3) 
Mean -.08 
(.07) 
-.37 
(.06) 
-.59 
(.08) 
 -.22 
(.04) 
 -.17 
(.03) 
-.59 
(.03) 
 -.00 
(.13) 
-.43 
(.10) 
-.63 
(.09) 
June 1931  
(t-stat) 
1.086*            
June 1932  
(t-stat) 
1.298 3.380***   -.995        
June 1933  
(t-stat) 
-.527 .472   -
1.606 
 -
1.288 
-
1.550 
    
N 35  46  36  14 
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Notes: *** significant at α = 0.01, ** significant at α = 0.05, * significant at α = 0.10. 
 (1) June 1929 - Dec 1930 cumulative deposit losses;  
 (2) June 1929 - Dec 1931 cumulative deposit losses;  
 (3) June 1929 - Dec 1932 cumulative deposit losses.  
First row gives the mean deposit growth rates (standard errors in parentheses). Next rows give t-statistics of 
differences between two means. Source: Statements. 
 
 
Table 9: Proportional odds discrete-time survival models, 1923-33 (binary dependent 
variable equals one at the time of failure), odds ratios 
 
 Constant baseline hazard (1) Positive duration dependence 
(2) 
log(time)  2477.729*** 
(2374.94) 
size 1.640*** 
(.26) 
.916 
(.17) 
capital 1.020 
(.01) 
.945*** 
(.02) 
reserve_dep 1.002 
(.00) 
1.001 
(.00) 
gvtbonds .961*** 
(.01) 
.953*** 
(.01) 
secloans .998 
(.02) 
1.009 
(.01) 
mortgages 1.088*** 
(.02) 
1.084*** 
(.02) 
other_re 1.076* 
(.05) 
1.054 
(.07) 
otherloans 1.064*** 
(.02) 
1.064*** 
(.02) 
bankhouse 1.036 
(.02) 
1.055** 
(.03) 
rearnings .942*** 
(.02) 
.950** 
(.02) 
age .692 
(.00) 
.638* 
(.17) 
N 
Prob > chi2 
Likelihood 
1492 
.000 
.18 
1492 
.000 
.41 
 
Notes: *** significant at α = 0.01, ** significant at α = 0.05, * significant at α = 0.10. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Odds ratios can be interpreted here as hazard ratios. Hazard ratios between zero and one decrease 
the probability of failure; hazard ratios above one increase it. Each variable has been multiplied by 100 so that 
a one unit increase can be interpreted as a one percentage increase in the ratio. Source: Statements. 
 
 
 
Table 10: Relationship between bank size and failure rate, June 1929 - June 1933 
 
Total Capital Number of banks Number of failures Failure rate (%) 
Less than $250,000 87 77 89 
51 
 
$250,001 - $375,000 16 14 88 
$375,001 - $800,00 45 36 80 
More than $800,00 45 33 73 
 
Notes: There are 193 banks in total in this table because they include those that are not part of any cohort, eg. 
those that failed between the chosen windows of failure. The actual bank total for June 1929 as the sum of 
each cohort is 131. Source: Statements.  
 
 
Table 11: Discrete-time proportional odds estimation, 1929-33 (binary dependent variable 
equals one at the time of failure), odds ratios 
 
 (1) (2) 
Capital 1.008 
(.01) 
.982 
(.01) 
Retained earnings .939*** 
(.02) 
.941*** 
(.02) 
Borrowed funds 1.043*** 
(.01) 
 
Total deposits  .972*** 
(.01) 
N 
Prob > chi2 
Likelihood 
885 
.000 
-284.22 
885 
.000 
-287.12 
 
Notes: *** significant at α = 0.01, ** significant at α = 0.05, * significant at α = 0.10. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Odds ratios can be interpreted here as hazard ratios. Hazard ratios between zero and one decrease 
the probability of failure; hazard ratios above one increase it. Each variable has been multiplied by 100 so that 
a one unit increase can be interpreted as a one percentage increase in the ratio. Source: Statements. 
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Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Annual number of new buildings in Chicago 
Source: Hoyt (1933, p.475). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Mean cumulative growth rate of total deposits (base time: June 1929) 
Source: Statements. 
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Figure 3: Restate loans to total assets (all categories) 
Source: Statements. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Capital to total assets 
Source: Statements. 
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Figure 5: New mortgages and trust deeds, Cook County, Illinois (\$) 
Note: the source does not specify whether new mortgages include renewed mortgages. 
Source: Hoyt (1933, p.475). 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Loans on collateral security to total assets 
Source: Statements. 
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Figure 7: Cash reserves to total deposits (cash, other cash resources, due from other banks) 
Source: Statements. 
 
 
Figure 8: U.S. government bonds to total assets 
Source: Statements. 
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Figure 9: Banking house, furniture and fixtures to total assets 
Source: Statements. 
 
 
Figure 10: Bills payable and rediscounts to total assets 
Source: Statements. 
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Figure 11: Retained earnings to net worth 
Source: Statements. 
 
 
Figure 12: Other loans to total assets 
Source: Statements. 
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Figure 13: Other real estate to total assets 
Source: Statements. 
 
 
Figure 14 : Total assets 
Source: Statements. 
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Figure 15: Median growth rate of mortgages (six months to six months) 
Source: Statements. 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Median growth rate of total assets (six months to six months) 
Source: Statements. 
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